Maximize Table Points, Don't Avoid Losing
A lot of game state inefficiencies in soccer stem from the fact that in league play, a team's objective should be to maximize the expected value of points in the table (where a win is worth +3, draw +1, and loss +0), NOT the probability of not losing.
Strategically this implies that aggression and risk-seeking behavior is +EV. For instance, a common mindset is that team shouldn't commit too many players forward in attack because that risks not having good defensive structure if a team loses the ball. However, these "risky" situations are a good thing in a world where winning is worth 3x drawing. Suppose the score is 0-0 and commiting a few extra players forward increases your chances of scoring a goal by 50% while increasing the chance you concede a goal by 50%. You're currently set to get +1 point from the game because it's a draw. Assuming it's close to the end of the game, committing extra players forward gives EV[Table Points] = 0.5 (+3) + 0.5 (0) = +1.5 points, or adds a whole half point in EV from points on the table, even if this increases your chances of losing the game.
For this reason I think that in neutral situations (or even situations where a team is up a point!) teams should also be more score-first aggressive around substitution strategies, for example by subbing off defenders for attackers. Intuitively in a neutral state long as you're improving your odds of winning by at least half the odds you're increasing your odds of losing, you're coming out ahead by expectation in terms of table points.
Metrics like team xG difference and even more sophisticated player value metrics like VAEP1 which maximize EV[Scoring] - EV[Conceding] likely do not optimize for Table Points correctly. An equivalent increase in scoring and conceding probability is a good thing because it takes away from draw probability and adds winning and losing probability, but would be valued as 0 here.
Note that tournament knockout round football is different - the objective is to maximize the probability of advancing to the next round not EV[Points], so a "draw" state is 50-50, or worth half rather than a third of a win. Conservatism makes a lot more sense there and strategically teams ought to be playing significantly differently than league or group stage play.
Longball Out of Bounds + Press From There
Launching the ball out of bounds to the opponent's touch line and setting up a press from there may be an unaesthetic but highly effective strategy. Read more here: The Longball Out of Bounds (LOB)
"Offensive Rebounding"
Going for "Offensive Rebounds" or crashing the shot after missed shots may be undervalued. Chances in soccer are so hard to come by to begin with, any action to maximize the number of "random" extra chances seems very fruitful to pursue. If a shot is taken and parried into play by the keeper, the defense is likely to be in a more disorganized state than normal run of play, and thus the offense may be able to get a higher than normal chance of scoring from the rebound.
According to John Muller's analysis2, only 3.6% of the Premier League's non-penalty goals come from shot rebounds, but this is "roughly on par with the 4.1 per cent of non-penalty goals scored within two actions after a corner and the 2.9 per cent in the two actions after a free kick." Considering the vast difference between the best set piece teams in Europe and the worst, it seems that this could similarly hold for rebounding.
There is anecdotal evidence of this: in Muller's list of the top 10 rebound shooters since 2013, 3 of them are Liverpool players. The more likely explanatory factor here is that the iconic front 3 of Mane Firmino and Salah played a ton of games together and got a ton of shots off, but eye test suggests that they're crashing from both the wings and the forward spot at a very high rate.
Even ignoring the goals and getting a shot off immediately, recovering the ball near the penalty box from a rebound seems like a good thing.
Move Washed Attackers Back
Anecdotally it seems that on balance attacking players are generally more technically proficient and athletic than players further back. This aligns with the general process of choosing positions at the youth level: the most athletic and talented players are often put at forward, and the less athletic are moved back closer to their own goal.
For example, of the 10 fastest players in the 2023 (defined as top sprint speed), 7 are attackers, 2 are midfielders, and 1 is a defender.
(A confounding factor is certainly that attacking players are more likely to make sprints forward and so more likely to hit their top speeds.)
A guess I have is that attackers who aren't good enough to play in first-team football may be able to play further back in midfield or defense, and some of them might still represent an upgrade over other options at those positions. It'd require retraining offensive habits and learning back-footed defense at a higher level, both way easier said than done; but in a world where we want to be maximizing +3 win probabilities anyways, maybe we want to be more front-footed?
One inspiration here is how in the MLB many shortstops are capable of transitioning to less demanding positions like third base or in the outfield.3