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· 5 min read

Maximize Table Points, Don't Avoid Losing

A lot of game state inefficiencies in soccer stem from the fact that in league play, a team's objective should be to maximize the expected value of points in the table (where a win is worth +3, draw +1, and loss +0), NOT the probability of not losing.

Strategically this implies that aggression and risk-seeking behavior is +EV. For instance, a common mindset is that team shouldn't commit too many players forward in attack because that risks not having good defensive structure if a team loses the ball. However, these "risky" situations are a good thing in a world where winning is worth 3x drawing. Suppose the score is 0-0 and commiting a few extra players forward increases your chances of scoring a goal by 50% while increasing the chance you concede a goal by 50%. You're currently set to get +1 point from the game because it's a draw. Assuming it's close to the end of the game, committing extra players forward gives EV[Table Points] = 0.5 (+3) + 0.5 (0) = +1.5 points, or adds a whole half point in EV from points on the table, even if this increases your chances of losing the game.

For this reason I think that in neutral situations (or even situations where a team is up a point!) teams should also be more score-first aggressive around substitution strategies, for example by subbing off defenders for attackers. Intuitively in a neutral state long as you're improving your odds of winning by at least half the odds you're increasing your odds of losing, you're coming out ahead by expectation in terms of table points.

Metrics like team xG difference and even more sophisticated player value metrics like VAEP1 which maximize EV[Scoring] - EV[Conceding] likely do not optimize for Table Points correctly. An equivalent increase in scoring and conceding probability is a good thing because it takes away from draw probability and adds winning and losing probability, but would be valued as 0 here.

Note that tournament knockout round football is different - the objective is to maximize the probability of advancing to the next round not EV[Points], so a "draw" state is 50-50, or worth half rather than a third of a win. Conservatism makes a lot more sense there and strategically teams ought to be playing significantly differently than league or group stage play.

Longball Out of Bounds + Press From There

Launching the ball out of bounds to the opponent's touch line and setting up a press from there may be an unaesthetic but highly effective strategy. Read more here: The Longball Out of Bounds (LOB)

"Offensive Rebounding"

Going for "Offensive Rebounds" or crashing the shot after missed shots may be undervalued. Chances in soccer are so hard to come by to begin with, any action to maximize the number of "random" extra chances seems very fruitful to pursue. If a shot is taken and parried into play by the keeper, the defense is likely to be in a more disorganized state than normal run of play, and thus the offense may be able to get a higher than normal chance of scoring from the rebound.

According to John Muller's analysis2, only 3.6% of the Premier League's non-penalty goals come from shot rebounds, but this is "roughly on par with the 4.1 per cent of non-penalty goals scored within two actions after a corner and the 2.9 per cent in the two actions after a free kick." Considering the vast difference between the best set piece teams in Europe and the worst, it seems that this could similarly hold for rebounding.

There is anecdotal evidence of this: in Muller's list of the top 10 rebound shooters since 2013, 3 of them are Liverpool players. The more likely explanatory factor here is that the iconic front 3 of Mane Firmino and Salah played a ton of games together and got a ton of shots off, but eye test suggests that they're crashing from both the wings and the forward spot at a very high rate.

Even ignoring the goals and getting a shot off immediately, recovering the ball near the penalty box from a rebound seems like a good thing.

Move Washed Attackers Back

Anecdotally it seems that on balance attacking players are generally more technically proficient and athletic than players further back. This aligns with the general process of choosing positions at the youth level: the most athletic and talented players are often put at forward, and the less athletic are moved back closer to their own goal.

For example, of the 10 fastest players in the 2023 (defined as top sprint speed), 7 are attackers, 2 are midfielders, and 1 is a defender. 2023 Fastest Soccer Players

(A confounding factor is certainly that attacking players are more likely to make sprints forward and so more likely to hit their top speeds.)

A guess I have is that attackers who aren't good enough to play in first-team football may be able to play further back in midfield or defense, and some of them might still represent an upgrade over other options at those positions. It'd require retraining offensive habits and learning back-footed defense at a higher level, both way easier said than done; but in a world where we want to be maximizing +3 win probabilities anyways, maybe we want to be more front-footed?

One inspiration here is how in the MLB many shortstops are capable of transitioning to less demanding positions like third base or in the outfield.3

· 7 min read

I believe that intentionally aiming to get the ball long out of bounds ("LOB") near the opposing corners in soccer is underutilized. I highlight a few reasons why below.

Offense

Given the starting point of:

  1. Having the ball close to the opposing team's goal is good.
  2. Having (or worse, losing) the ball in your own defensive third is bad.
  3. Throw-in's, especially near one's own goal, have a low rate of retention (~40%) and don't go very far1.

A logical conclusion is that forcing an opposing throw-in near their own goal (by launching out of bounds there) is likely a positive expected value strategy relative to attempting to progress it from near your own goal.

To give a rough estimate of how large the edge from this strategy could be, check out this xT2 (interpreted as the "percentage chance of scoring from the possession when the ball is in that position") plot from the Athletic, with the LOB pass drawn on: xT Grid

When only considering the offensive value from this strategy:

  1. Starting from your own defensive third is worth ~0.2% to 0.5% in xT, or goal probability. Let's assume it's worth +0.4%.
  2. An opposing throw-in from the boxes near their own corner has a roughly 40% chance of possession retention. That is, 60% of the time it results in losing possession.
  3. Recovery of possession in that area is worth roughly 1.3% to 2.0% in xT. Conservatively, let's say it's worth 1.3%.

From 2 and 3 the odds of converting a goal from a successful LOB is worth around: 60% * 1.3% = 0.78%. This rudimentary calculation suggests that we are nearly doubling (from 0.4% to 0.78%) the odds of scoring a goal relative to normal run of play from the defensive third.

My confidence intervals around these estimates are extremely wide because the xT square-based approach only accounts for the average case EV of locations rather than situationally off a throw-in or a launch, and there is large uncertainty over where the ball would actually end up in play after a throw-in. Further, most throw-ins don't result from this LOB context, so the throw-in retention numbers might be off as well. However, I believe it's directionally correct that the EV of this strategy is likely quite positive.

Defense

This undersells the additional defensive value we get from this strategy. Losing possession near ones own goal-scoring half is catastrophic: it takes a ~0.4% goal scoring opportunity and converts it to at least a ~3% opportunity for the other team (likely much worse because the defense is less settled than normal run of play). This is the foundation behind why high-pressing has become much more frequent amongst teams capable of executing it.

This strategy instead risks losing the ball in the least dangerous area of the pitch, in a situation where the opposing team is only likely to retain immediate possession ~40% of the time.

Comparison vs. Route-1 Launches

The concepts here aren't novel. Long ball route one soccer3 has been discussed for decades, and more recently utilized by certain under-resourced teams.4 The strategy of launching the ball and pressing out of that has affectionately referred to as "launch and squish."5 There has been much written about how long kicks like these, for example in the context of long goal kicks, might be suboptimal6. However, the improvements of this more specific subset of the long-ball strategy may include:

  1. LOBs as opposed to in-play long balls offer the unique edge of low throw-in retention rates.
  2. LOBs give more time for your players to set up pressure compared to in-play long balls. Throw-ins generally take 7-15 seconds after the ball goes out of touch1 (though it is worth considering if a response to this strategy would be quick throw-ins).
  3. Even if the opponent retains possession from a throw-in, them doing so along the wings offers even less value than if they recovered the ball more centrally.
  4. In the limit of launch and squish's evolution, the other team could just launch it back. Throw-ins have a much shorter range of motion than regular passes, making this counter harder and conditional on successfully receiving the initial throw-in.

Not to mention, the LOB strategy is not mutually exclusive with regular short passes and in-play long balls. If the LOB strategy is successful, it may be worth mixing in in-play long balls with hold up players, and shorter passes, to keep the defense strategically honest.

Other Situations

Kicking it out of bounds to the LOB area may be strategic outside of the defensive third.

For example, if you are in the attacking third and a less technically proficient player receives an imperfect pass, the probability of a turnover leading to an opposing counter-attack may be sufficiently high; it may be worth kicking it out of bounds to instead force a throw-in that has a high probability of being regained.

Similarly, if a player is trapped in the opposing corner, one of the most likely outcomes is a goal kick, which has much higher completion odds than a throw-in given the increase in control and range the keeper has over the ball with his foot. Instead, it may be worth tapping the ball out of bounds and trying to regain the ball from there.

Depending on team composition, this strategy can be even more effective (or much worse) than in the average case. A team battling relegation has very little shot of progressing the ball normally from their goal to the opposing one through a Man City or Liverpool press (and probably is more likely to give up the ball in a dangerous position), but may have a shot of regaining possession from a throw-in, where the role of on-ball skill level is comparatively diminished. Why not try?

Counterguments

  • The effect size is overstated because there's a decent chance you launch it either not out bounds or through the end line for a goal kick
    • True, I believe with training if it's a larger component of a strategy, players would be capable of successfully executing this pass at a relatively high rate. This remains to be seen.
  • Most teams that can successfully execute a high press also are possession teams e.g. the Barca and Man City's of the world. High press is tiring but you rest when you have the ball.
    • Ideally, possession would be re-established after the LOB, just higher up the pitch. However the fatigue aspect is valid concern and perhaps means that it should be more selectively used rather than on every single possession.
    • I also wonder how much of the high press sides being possession teams is an artifact of the fact that the best and most physically fit players are also technically proficient, or rather the combination of both of those factors compose the best sides in the world like Man City and Barca. There is some precedent of teams that truly commit to pressing even without organized possession, such as Eibar7.
  • The numbers for recovery from throw in are likely inflated due to not having enough time to get your players in position.
    • If LOBs were included as part of an overall strategy, you'd have numbers stationed up higher to begin with, so players wouldn't have to run all the way from their goal to the opposing one to get in position. However, this perhaps points to the advantage of less extreme longball out of bounds kicks, for example from midfield instead.

What else am I missing?